

Within 50 days
of the fall of the Syrian regime,
Daesh revives and begins its
expansion in Syria.



2025

Introduction:

The operation carried out by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and the management of military operations against the former regime provided a rare and exceptional time window for the terrorist organization Daesh to reorganize its ranks, establish the necessary geographic connections for its movements and activities, and activate all its cells, both active and dormant. This has allowed the group to transition from a security phase to a military phase, initiating territorial control while taking advantage of international preoccupation with ongoing crises in Syria and the region. Daesh has also capitalized on its affiliated or ideologically influenced extremist «jihadists» to execute its attacks.

As a result, fears over the resurgence of Daesh activity have been on the rise, posing a serious concern amid the international community's reluctance to provide effective tools and sufficient support to counter its expansion. This growing threat has had a significant impact on efforts aimed at ensuring stability and sustainable development in recent years.

The Monitoring and Information Center (MIC) presents in the following link a collection of video recordings that support the information included in this report. The report covers more than 50 days of the new phase in Syria, during which a transitional government is assuming its responsibilities concerning security and internal affairs.

https://drive.google.com/drive/1WBXoPk8GTy3do17ShB_foldersusp=sharing?horrbazFf84q0

First: The Anniversary of the Industrial Prison Attack and Local Concerns:

In January 2025, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria commemorates the most violent attack by the terrorist organization Daesh on the Industrial Prison in the southern part of Hasakah, located at coordinates 37SFA5785038258. The attack began with Daesh detonating explosive-laden vehicles, coinciding with an intense armed assault from outside the prison walls, while simultaneously triggering an uprising and riot inside the facility. The fierce fighting lasted for 10 days, during which the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Internal Security Forces were forced to impose a curfew and establish security cordons around the prison, eventually extending them to the entire city of Hasakah as Daesh fighters managed to infiltrate urban areas.


The operation necessitated direct intervention by the International Coalition, both aerially and on the ground, to repel Daesh and put an end to their bloody uprising. During the assault, Daesh prisoners and attackers executed 77 prison staff members, most of whom were beheaded. The total human losses exceeded 121 fighters and civilians, some of whom were taken hostage and executed on the spot.

Second: The Current State of Daesh Terrorist Activity:

At a rate of one attack approximately every 60 hours, Daesh has carried out terrorist operations targeting various areas in North and East Syria since the fall of the former Syrian regime. The group has mobilized both its sleeper and active cells across the region, aiming to destabilize security and undermine the foundations of stability.

The Monitoring and Information Center (MIC) has been tracking Daesh activity since December 2024 ,8, documenting its attacks within the Autonomous Administration areas. The indicator below illustrates the recorded attacks, which have reached a total of 20 operations. The number of casualties includes 10 civilians and members of security and military forces who lost their lives, while 5 Daesh attackers were either killed or injured.

Anti-Dash operations in northern and eastern Syria within 50 days




Third: Preventive Measures in North and East Syria:

The Internal Security Forces have intensified their efforts to combat Daesh terrorist activity and dismantle cells that threaten the security of North and East Syria. The Monitoring and Information Center (MIC) has documented all counter-terrorism operations since the fall of the former Syrian regime, recording an average of one operation every 90 hours.

A total of 13 counter-terrorism operations have been conducted, leading to the arrest of 60 Daesh cell members and affiliates, while 17 members of these cells were either killed or injured.

Dash attacks and their human impacts in 50 days



Fourth: The Exploitation of Daesh Activity in North and East Syria

Following the fall of the Syrian regime, factions affiliated with the Turkish-backed National Army have taken advantage of the general climate to incite unrest, facilitating Daesh's ability to operate within North and East Syria. Simultaneously, these factions have carried out terrorist operations in the region. However, security and military forces have acted swiftly to arrest those involved and prevent further escalation.

On January 2025 ,25, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) arrested two members of a U.S.-sanctioned faction within the National Army operating in Hasakah, whose aim was to create chaos and instigate disorder.

On January 2025 ,18, the Internal Security Forces conducted a security operation targeting a foreign-affiliated cell within the National Army in the village of Mujibira, in the eastern countryside of Hasakah. This cell had previously carried out attacks against security checkpoints. During the operation, weapons, equipment, and ammunition were confiscated from one of the arrested individuals.



Fifth: Daesh Activity in Syrian Areas Surrounding North and East Syria:

Daesh's primary geographic stronghold as a controlling force is concentrated in the Syrian desert (Badiya), specifically in the Abu Rjameen Mountain area (coordinates: 37SDU6244871750). This location serves as a key launch point for Daesh field operations, allowing the group to move towards the western bank of the Euphrates River and infiltrate Autonomous Administration areas to smuggle weapons and equipment used in terrorist attacks. It also functions as a major gathering hub for significant Daesh members and leaders.

The organization maintains communication with its cells spread across areas it controlled before March 2019. High-ranking leaders oversee operations, strengthen links between cells, recruit new members, and facilitate the movement of weapons, combat equipment, technology, and explosives.

Daesh seeks to exploit the security vacuum in the Syrian desert and the western side of the Euphrates River to expand its presence. It has also taken advantage of the opportunity to seize weapons, ammunition, and military equipment depots that were previously under the control of Iranian-backed militias and Syrian regime forces. These depots were strategically important along the Tehran-Beirut corridor and served as key transit points for weapons shipments to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

Despite its control over the western banks of the Euphrates, the transitional government led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has not yet conducted a clearance operation in this part of Syria. This inaction has allowed Daesh to revive its security structure and prepare for the next phase of territorial expansion.



Recently, Daesh Has Been Seeking to Exploit Eight Key Factors:

1. Exploiting the Widespread Presence in Areas Occupied by Turkey: Daesh benefits from its widespread presence in areas controlled by Turkey in northern Syria, especially in Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain), Tell Abyad, Jarabulus, Manbij, and Al-Bab. This allows the group to strengthen its operations, secure logistical supplies, and increase its attacks, which further undermine stability within the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).
2. Exploiting the Tunnels Previously Built by Iranian, Afghan, and Pakistani Militias: Daesh is utilizing tunnels that were previously built by Iranian, Afghan, and Pakistani militias loyal to the Syrian regime in cooperation with Hezbollah and Syrian factions from Deir ez-Zor. These tunnels help conceal the group's movements and its transport of weapons and ammunition.

3. Exploiting Radical Groups in Northwest Syria: Daesh is focusing on extremist groups in northwestern Syria and areas controlled by the Transitional Government, aiming to recruit fighters and increase its operations in multiple regions, particularly in the area extending from the southeastern countryside of Aleppo to the Deir ez-Zor border with Iraq, eastern Damascus, and northern Sweida.

4. Maintaining a Presence in Areas Controlled by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS): Hundreds of Daesh members, including key leaders, remain within areas controlled by HTS in Idlib, where they continue their operations. A prominent example was the first leader of Daesh, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was killed in Idlib in October 2019. This was followed by the killing of Abdullah Qardash in 2022, who was responsible for planning the attack on the Al-Sina'a prison in Hasakah while residing in Idlib. Moreover, Abu Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi, Qardash's successor, was killed in Daraa in 2022.



In mid-January 2025, the international coalition targeted two former Daesh members who had joined HTS and were secretly operating for Daesh.

On January 2025 ,30, the coalition killed a senior militant leader from extremist Islamist groups in northwestern Syria through an air-to-ground missile strike.

5. Training a New Generation of Fighters (Cubs of the Caliphate): Daesh has trained a new generation of young fighters, known as the «Cubs of the Caliphate,» alongside experienced militants who infiltrated from various parts of Syria into Daesh's last stronghold. The group has established structured communication networks with its cells in AANES, enabling it to regain territorial control in ungoverned areas, particularly in the Syrian desert (Badia).

Recruiting minors and preparing them for combat is a core tactic for Daesh as a response to the significant losses it has suffered in past battles, counterterrorism operations, and the large-scale imprisonments since its territorial defeat in 2019. This strategy mirrors that of HTS, which also targeted displaced people forced into Idlib through deals with the former Syrian regime, contributing to the HTS-led offensive that led to the fall of the Syrian regime.

6. Strategic Link Between Syria and Iraq: The geographical link between Daesh-controlled areas in Syria and Iraq provides a direct connection to its origins in Iraq, its supporters, and its ideological base. This cross-border network increases the likelihood of former Daesh members rejoining the group.



7. Tribal Networks in North and East Syria: Some tribal members in North and East Syria support Daesh's goal of destabilizing the region, allowing it to shift from a hidden terrorist network to a fully operational military force with territorial control. In the past, tribal leaders within AANES have intervened to release Daesh detainees, who then returned to terrorist activities, such as weapons smuggling, recruitment, and sheltering Daesh members.

Additionally, tribal figures connected to Turkish-backed factions in Serekaniye and Tell Abyad maintain close ties with Daesh leaders and factions accused of committing severe human rights violations against civilians.

8. Attacking Prisons to Release Daesh Fighters: Daesh aims to free thousands of its members from detention facilities in Hasakah, Raqqa, and other areas within AANES.

Previous large-scale prison breaks have raised fears of a resurgence of the group, particularly in Al-Sina'a prison in Hasakah and neighboring detention centers. Armed Daesh sleeper cells in these areas may mobilize for coordinated attacks, posing a significant threat to security both inside Syria and internationally.

Sixth: Lone Wolves – A Non-Networked Recruitment Strategy:

The terrorist organization Daesh has intensified its networked cell operations, maintaining covert communications to ensure the presence of both sleeper and active cells in North and East Syria and other parts of the country. At the same time, Daesh has promoted and reinforced the «lone wolf» concept, which encourages individuals or small, non-organically linked groups to carry out attacks worldwide using traditional methods or unconventional tactics such as stabbings, vehicle rammings, and indiscriminate shootings at specific events, celebrations, and crowded public spaces.

Daesh has actively promoted leaderless jihad, exploiting security agencies' difficulties in predicting such attacks and the diverse methods of execution. The group has focused its recruitment efforts on disconnected migrants, sympathetic individuals, and the uneducated, using online propaganda and extremist messaging tools. Recent examples include attacks in Germany, the UK, and France. Additionally, Daesh has incited its followers through official publications to burn buildings, particularly high-rise structures, as well as forests, vital infrastructure, service facilities, and public and private properties.



Recently, Daesh released a new high-production propaganda video, signaling a return to media-driven recruitment. Through this release, the group aimed to send two implicit messages:

1. Daesh continues to rely on executions by beheading.
2. The reappearance of Abu Abdullah al-Faransi (Maxime Hauchard), a French

national who entered Syria through Turkey in August 2013. He was featured in a November 2014 video executing former Syrian regime soldiers and American hostage Peter Kassig, a former U.S. soldier turned humanitarian worker who was kidnapped in Syria in October 2013. Hauchard also appeared in October 2014, executing British national Alan Henning, who was later killed in November following the U.S. president's decision to deploy 1,500 troops to Iraq to train Baghdad's government forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga in their fight against Daesh.

Seventh: The Emergence of Daesh in Areas Controlled by the Transitional Government:

Key Daesh figures and a significant number of members have been identified within the ranks of the «Military Operations Administration,» appearing in video footage from areas controlled by the Transitional Government, including the Syrian coast, Aleppo, Damascus, and other provinces. Meanwhile, both local and international voices have intensified calls to expel foreign fighters from the new Transitional Government's forces, especially after reports surfaced that several non-Syrian commanders have been appointed to leadership positions within the Ministry of Defense in the interim government.

The documented presence of Daesh within the territories controlled by the Transitional Government, particularly in recently seized Syrian provinces, raises serious concerns about the group's resurgence in these areas. This development could increase terrorist activity across Syria, creating a new environment for extremist organizations to regain territorial control.

The Transitional Government has demanded that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) hand over prisons containing thousands of Daesh leaders and fighters. This request poses a significant threat, as it suggests a reckless approach to the Daesh issue and disregard for the potential consequences—especially given that former Daesh fighters now operate within Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or other extremist factions.

The Monitoring and Information Center (MIC) has documented multiple video recordings showing members of the Military Operations Administration and military units within the interim government carrying Daesh flags and adopting the group's propaganda and recruitment methods.

Eight: Daesh Supporter Activities:

The situation inside the Al-Hol camp has remained chaotic, with signs of intentional violence directed at the humanitarian organizations operating in the camp, which houses over 40,000 residents, including displaced Syrians and families of Daesh members and leaders of various nationalities.

In the «muhajirat» section of Al-Hol camp, women attacked a Médecins Sans Frontières hospital, creating chaos and trapping staff in their offices. They also attacked the camp's market, saying, «Jolani will come and liberate us from you.» Internal security forces intervened, while organizations have been conducting «intentions assessments» for Syrian nationals in the camp to reintegrate them into their respective communities.

Concerns have arisen among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) over potential robberies along roads connecting Al-Hol camp to towns in the Jazira region. Internal security forces are trying to maintain security on these roads after NGOs halted their operations in the camp since December 11 due to fears of attacks. Recently, operations have been limited to life-saving activities until the security and humanitarian situation in the camp becomes clearer.

Earlier, extremists attacked an NGO warehouse in a camp in the Raqqa countryside, causing significant damage to most of the materials stored there, which were set on fire.

The threat level has increased at detention centers housing Daesh members and leaders in North and East Syria as the overall chaos in Syria rises. This coincides with Daesh exploiting Turkish attacks in the region between Kobani and Manbij and its continued presence in the Syrian desert. There are concerns about attacks targeting these centers, three of which are located within approximately 5 square kilometers in the southern part of Hasakah city.

According to monitoring operations, there are fears of a plot similar to what occurred in January 2022, with both open and hidden calls for such an attack. In that case, Daesh launched a surprise assault on a prison, freeing hundreds of prisoners who carried out mass executions of prison guards and staff, some of whom escaped with the help of cells linked to tribes in the prison's surrounding area.

Information released at the time indicated that a specific group of Daesh leaders escaped, with some reportedly reaching areas controlled by the former Syrian regime on the western banks of the Euphrates River. Sources mentioned that Abu Yusuf is believed to be one of the escapees from Daesh who fled from the Al-Sina'a prison in Hasakah in 2022.

Ninth: Concerns and Possibilities:

The Transitional Government's requirement to oversee prisons housing Daesh members and leaders, as part of an agreement with the SDF and the Autonomous Administration, raises concerns among the public in North and East Syria. The potential release of Daesh leaders or members could rejuvenate the group in new ways, aligning with changes in the conflict's dynamics.

The failure to clear the desert by the military operations led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has shown signs of allowing Daesh cells to operate freely. The main objectives are to attack the Autonomous Administration areas of North and East Syria and the SDF military points, while also preparing the ground for gaining international support for the Syrian Transitional Government, which is closely linked to Turkey, which denies the existence of Daesh.

Despite the collapse of the former regime and the deployment of military operations along the western banks of the Euphrates River, militia activity loyal to the former regime has renewed its targeting of areas on the eastern banks of the Euphrates in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor. This increases the risk posed by the fragile military administration and weak monitoring of armed group activities west of the Euphrates, including Daesh cells.

There is a significant possibility of communication between leadership elements of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group listed as a terrorist organization, and Daesh cells to provide equipment and supplies to create chaos in the Autonomous Administration areas of North and East Syria, destabilizing the region. This mirrors the February 2016 attack on the Khanasser road south of Aleppo, which was a coordinated attack between opposition factions and Daesh with the mediation of the Dawood Brigade. Daesh may exploit the Transitional Government-controlled areas as a safe haven to transfer and launder money, and increase their stockpiles of ammunition, weapons, and military equipment, posing a threat to the security and stability of North and East Syria.

Intensive security monitoring in North and East Syria has confirmed movements of Daesh members organized within both dormant and active cells in various parts of the region, aiming to stir up chaos and disrupt stability within the region.

Tenth: Daesh Identifiers and Media Promotion:

Issues (479 - 478 - 477 - 476 - 475) of the official Naba newspaper published by Daesh discuss attacks carried out by the group's cells in various areas of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, targeting internal security forces and military units. These issues were accompanied by numerous photos in an attempt to document the group's attacks.

Daesh's official identifiers on social media platforms published reports similar to those made since the declaration of the group's «Caliphate» in 2014, continuing even after its geographical defeat in North and East Syria in March 2019.

Daesh's identifiers on Telegram announced several attacks targeting Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions in different rural areas of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, using various justifications, the most prominent being the targeting of PKK forces. These terms align with the rhetoric used by Turkey and its supported factions within the «National Army,» as well as most jihadist groups in Syria.

The group used machine guns and rocket launchers during the attacks, praising its fighters who carried out these operations. This suggests the group's intent to persist and expand its influence once again over Syrian territory, especially in North and East Syria, under different covers made possible by local conditions and regional interventions.

Through these actions, Daesh aims to adopt «lone wolf» attacks that are not claimed by any party, while feeding its supporters with misleading information to foster the idea of the «Caliphate's survival,» simultaneously promoting the group's strength and its potential return to the battlefield.

وتفصيلاً، بتوفيق الله تعالى، هاجم جنود الخلافة حاجزا لميليشيا PKK، شمال بلدة (الصور)، في يوم السبت (٢٠/ جمادى الآخرة)، بالأسلحة الرشاشة، دون معرفة الخسائر في صفوفهم.

خاص
أفاد مصدر خاص لـ (النبا) أن جنود الخلافة بولاية الشام هاجموا في هذا الأسبوع حاجزا لـ PKK المرتدين في البركة.

هجوم على حاجز لـ PKK في البركة



خاص
النبا

استهداف آلية لـ PKK في قرية (ضبيعة) بمنطقة (الشداي)

مقتل وإصابة عناصر من الـ PKK بكمين لجنود الخلافة في البركة

ولاية الشام - البركة

قتل عنصر من الـ PKK وأصيب آخرون بكمين مسلح لجنود الخلافة بولاية الشام هذا الأسبوع جنوب البركة. وفي التفاصيل، بتوفيق الله تعالى، كمن جنود الخلافة في يوم الاثنين (٢٩/

قتيل من الـ PKK بعملية لجنود الخلافة في الخير



خاص
النبا

أسر وقتل عنصر من الـ PKK في بلدة (أبو خشب)



وسائل إعلام محلية صورا أخرى للعنصر بعد قتله، ولله الحمد.

الأسبوع الماضي

وكان جنود الخلافة بولاية الشام قد استهدفوا آلية لـ PKK المرتدين وقتلوا وأصابوا عددا ممن كان على متنها بهجوم مسلح الأسبوع الماضي في الخير.

ولاية الشام - الخير

النبا

أفاد مصدر خاص لـ (النبا) أن جنود الخلافة بولاية الشام قتلوا أحد عناصر ميليشيا الـ PKK بعد مدهامة منزله هذا الأسبوع في الخير. وفي التفاصيل، بتوفيق الله تعالى، داهم جنود الخلافة في يوم الخميس (١٦/ رجب)، منزل عنصر بميليشيا الـ PKK المرتدين، في بلدة (أبو خشب)، وقتلوه نحرا. وحصلت (النبا) على صورة حصرية للعنصر أثناء أسره، فيما نشرت

أخبار

العدد ٤٧٧
الخميس ٩ رجب ١٤٤٦ هـ

النبا

٤ قتلى من الـ PKK المرتدين بهجوم مباغت لجنود الخلافة في الخير



عنصر من الـ PKK قبيل إطلاق المجاهدين النار عليه في قرية (جزيرة أبو حميد)

ولاية الشام - الخير

النبا

أسقط جنود الخلافة أربعة قتلى من عناصر ميليشيا الـ PKK المرتدين بهجوم مسلح على تركز لهم هذا الأسبوع في الخير. وفي التفاصيل، بتوفيق الله تعالى، هاجم جنود الخلافة في يوم الاثنين (٦/ رجب)، تركزا لـ PKK المرتدين، في قرية (جزيرة أبو حميد) بمنطقة (الكسرة)، واستهدفهم بالأسلحة الرشاشة، ما أدى لمقتل أربعة عناصر.

خاص

وأفاد مصدر خاص لـ (النبا) أن المجاهدين باغتوا المرتدين وهم ناشون، فقتلوا ثلاثة عناصر ثم قبضوا على العنصر الرابع وقتلوه داخل التركز. واغتنم المجاهدون بندقيتين وذخيرة، وعادوا إلى مواقعهم سالمين، ولله الحمد. ونشرت وكالة (أعماق) شريطا مصورا أظهر جنود الخلافة وهم يقتلون عنصرا من الـ PKK بعد أن قتلوا ثلاثة عناصر آخرين في نفس المكان



الأربعاء 1 رجب 1446 هـ

ولاية الشام - البركة

بتوفيق الله تعالى، كمن جنود الخلافة لآلية لـ PKK المرتدين، في قرية (ضبيعة) بمنطقة (الشداي) أول أمس، واستهدفوها بالأسلحة الرشاشة، ما أدى لإصابة عدد منهم وتضرر الآلية، ولله الحمد.



الثلاثاء 14 رجب 1446 هـ

ولاية الشام - الخير

بتوفيق الله تعالى، استهدف جنود الخلافة آية للـ PKK المرتدين، قرب قرية (الزر) بمنطقة (البصرة) أمس، بالأسلحة الرشاشة، ما أدى لمقتل وإصابة عدد منهم، والله الحمد.



الأربعاء 22 رجب 1446 هـ

ولاية الشام - البركة

بتوفيق الله تعالى، هاجم جنود الخلافة حاجزا للـ PKK المرتدين، في مدينة (القامشلي) يوم الخميس الماضي، بطلقات مسدس، ما أدى لمقتل عنصرين واغتنام بندقية وإحراق الحاجز، والله الحمد.



الجمعة 12 جمادى الآخرة 1446 هـ

ولاية الشام - الخير

بتوفيق الله تعالى، هاجم جنود الخلافة حاجزا للـ PKK المرتدين، في قرية (جزرة البو حميد) بمنطقة (الكسرة) أول أمس، واشتبكوا معهم بالأسلحة الرشاشة والقذائف الصاروخية، ما أدى لإصابة عدد منهم وفرارهم وإحراق الحاجز واغتنام 3 بنادق ورشاش متوسط وذخيرة، والله الحمد.



الجمعة 12 جمادى الآخرة 1446 هـ

ولاية الشام - الخير

بتوفيق الله تعالى، اشتبك جنود الخلافة مع دورية للـ PKK المرتدين، في بلدة (الشحيل) أمس، بالأسلحة الرشاشة، ما أدى لإصابة عدد منهم، والله الحمد.



الثلاثاء 16 جمادى الآخرة 1446 هـ

ولاية الشام - الخير

بتوفيق الله تعالى، استهدف جنود الخلافة تمركزا للـ PKK المرتدين، قرب حقل (الجفرة) النفطي، بالأسلحة الرشاشة، ما أدى لإصابة عنصر، والله الحمد.



الأربعاء 17 جمادى الآخرة 1446 هـ

ولاية الشام - الخير

بتوفيق الله تعالى، أسر جنود الخلافة 3 عناصر من الـ PKK المرتدين، في بلدة (صباح الخير) أول أمس، وقتلوه بالأسلحة الرشاشة، والله الحمد.

Appendix: Daesh Attacks in North and East Syria and Counter-Daesh Operations

1. Appendix of Daesh Attacks in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria:

On January 2025 ,26, Daesh militants attacked an internal security forces patrol around the city of Hasakah using three motorcycles and threw two hand grenades at the patrol. The patrol responded with gunfire, resulting in the death of one attacker and the capture of two others.

On January 2025 ,24, Daesh militants attacked a checkpoint of the internal security forces in Hasakah, resulting in the death of one security member.

On January 2025 ,21, an Daesh cell attacked an internal security forces patrol in the city of Tal Hamis, south of Qamishli in the Jazira region. One member of the cell targeted the patrol with a personal firearm, and during the exchange of fire, the attacker was killed. Weapons, hand grenades, a military pouch, medical supplies, narcotics, and money were found on the attacker.

On January 2025 ,21, an Daesh member attacked a checkpoint of the internal security forces in Tal Brak, south of Qamishli, but no casualties occurred, and the attacker

On January 2025 ,20, an Daesh cell consisting of five members attacked a checkpoint of the internal security forces between the cities of Hasakah and Shaddadi. A heavy exchange of gunfire occurred, during which one member of the attacking cell was wounded and later died from their injuries.

On January 2025 ,2, Daesh cells attacked a security checkpoint in the city of Shaddadi (coordinate: 37SFV555239146), resulting in the martyrdom of two internal security forces members.

On December 31, Daesh cells attacked the Iskenderun checkpoint in the village of Tal Hamis (coordinate: 37SGA1008847249), resulting in the martyrdom of one internal security forces member.

On December 31, Daesh cells attacked a checkpoint in the village of Al-Zunud in Qamishli (coordinate: 37SFB9915400736), throwing hand grenades at the checkpoint, causing material damage.

On December 30, Daesh cells attacked an internal security forces vehicle in the city of Shaddadi (coordinate: 37SFV555239146), injuring two internal security forces

On December 28, Daesh cells attacked a civilian home in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, firing heavily at the house while chanting the group's slogans.

On December 26, Daesh cells attacked the town of Tishrin (coordinate: 37SDV8825398499) in the northern countryside of Raqqa, attacking the municipality, killing the municipality guard, burning vehicles, and vandalizing the facilities before fleeing.

On December 25, Daesh cells attacked a vehicle of the military discipline units of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the village of Markada (coordinate: 37SFV6002658882) in the northern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, resulting in the death of one member of the military discipline unit.

On December 25, an Daesh cell attacked a vehicle of the Syrian Democratic Forces in the town of Shaheel (coordinate: SFU3315485852) in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, resulting in the death of one military member and the attackers fleeing in the town, which had witnessed several Daesh attacks in the past.

On December 25, Daesh cells attacked the water station in the town of Dhiban (coordinate: 37SFU3715274718) in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, with an RPG shell causing material damage but no casualties. Daesh cells and affiliated militias had previously used Dhiban as an operational base after the collapse of Daesh in 2019.

On December 23, Daesh cells attacked a checkpoint in the Hawijah area, resulting in clashes between the attackers, who were on a motorcycle, and the internal security forces at the checkpoint (coordinate: 37SEV9797425344).

On December 23, Daesh militants on a motorcycle targeted a vehicle of the Counter Narcotics Forces of the internal security forces on the main highway near the town of Muhaymida in the western countryside of Deir ez-Zor (coordinate: 37SEV9794223305), resulting in injuries to two Counter Narcotics Forces members.

On December 22, an Daesh cell attacked the Wadi Raml checkpoint in the Al-Areesha camp north of Shaddadi (coordinate: 37SFA6702014057) with two vehicles, wounding two internal security members and one attacker.

On December 22, an Daesh cell attacked a checkpoint of the internal security forces in the village of Al-Sabha in the Deir ez-Zor countryside (coordinate: 37SFU2928696453), causing injuries to two internal security members.

On December 17, four Daesh militants attacked a checkpoint in Al-Kasrat, east of Raqqa (coordinate: 37SEV6621160449), killing three internal security members and injuring another, along with a civilian who was nearby.

On December 10, Daesh cells attacked an internal security forces site in the Sabkha area (coordinate: 37SEV2376536088) on the western banks of the Euphrates River in the eastern countryside of Raqqa, causing the death of one internal security member.

2. Counter-Terrorism Operations in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria:

On January 2025 ,26, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) arrested two Daesh members in the city of Qamishli for their involvement in planning terrorist attacks within the city, planting explosive devices, and spreading chaos.

On January 2025 ,24, the SDF carried out a security operation in the town of Khasham, east of Deir ez-Zor, and arrested two Daesh cell members who had participated in carrying out terrorist attacks against military and security forces, service institutions, and fuel tankers.

On January 2025 ,2, the Internal Security Forces, in coordination with the International Coalition, arrested seven members of Daesh cells in eastern Deir ez-Zor.

On December 2024 ,30, the Internal Security Forces carried out a security operation in villages that were under the control of the previous Syrian regime east and south of Qamishli, resulting in clashes with a wanted individual, during which one security member was injured. Weapons, ammunition, and military equipment were seized.

On December 2024 ,28, the Internal Security Forces arrested 27 individuals belonging to Daesh in the town of Al-Karama, east of Raqqa (coordinate:

On December 2024 ,27, the Internal Security Forces, in coordination with the International Coalition, arrested four members of Daesh in the Deir ez-Zor countryside.

On December 2024 ,25, the Internal Security Forces and the Anti-Terrorism Forces (HAT) conducted a wide-ranging search operation around the central prison in the Rumeilah neighborhood of Raqqa (coordinate: 37SEV0226280325) targeting Daesh cells and individuals collaborating with the group. The operation coincided with the rising signs of Daesh cells' activity in Raqqa and its surroundings. Military and technical equipment was found during the operation.

On December 2024 ,23, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted an airstrike targeting a truck transporting a weapons shipment in areas previously controlled by the Syrian regime, pro-regime militias, and Russian forces. The strike resulted in the deaths of two Daesh members and the injury of another. CENTCOM confirmed that the airstrike was part of its continued commitment to cooperate with partners in the region to disrupt and weaken terrorist efforts in planning, organizing, and executing attacks against civilians and military personnel in the U.S., its allies, and partners in the region and beyond.

On December 2024 ,22, the Internal Security Forces thwarted a planned terrorist attack targeting the area surrounding the Conoco Base (coordinate: 37SFV1992912038), a joint base between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the International Coalition in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.

On December 2024 ,21, the Syrian Democratic Forces, supported by the International Coalition, carried out a security operation in the city of Raqqa (coordinate: 37SEV0080478367), arresting 18 wanted Daesh members and individuals suspected of collaborating with the group within the city.

On December 2024 ,19, U.S. Central Command announced the killing of the Daesh leader in Syria, «Mahmoud Abu Yusuf,» in an airstrike targeting him and another member of the group in an area previously controlled by the Syrian regime, pro-Iranian militias, tribal forces, and Russian forces west of the Euphrates in the Deir ez-Zor countryside.

On December 2024 ,16, U.S. Central Command targeted an Daesh position in central Syria, in areas formerly controlled by the Syrian regime and pro-regime militias and Russian forces, resulting in the deaths of 12 Daesh members. This operation was part of the ongoing effort to prevent the group from re-establishing itself militarily.

On December 2024 ,8, the Pentagon announced that its aircraft had struck over 75 Daesh targets in Syria on the day the previous Syrian regime fell. The airstrikes aimed to prevent Daesh from carrying out external operations and ensure the group would not take advantage of the current situation to re-establish itself in central Syria.